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Abstract 
Over the years, the unique form of cooperative settlement known as a Kib-
butz, has had to undergo various difficulties and changes, yet it has 
managed to maintain its principles and survive. However, during the last 
decade, many kibbutzim have made substantial changes which contradict 
traditional Kibbutz ideology. This article is based on the report of the Pub-
lic Committee for the kibbutzim, established in 2002 to recommend a new 
legal definition befitting the development that took place in the kibbutzim 
in the last decades. The Committee was also asked to submit its opinion on 
the issue of allocating apartments to kibbutz members. The article describes 
the inevitable changes that have occurred and analyzes the reasons and con-
siderations that have led to the creation of a new form of Kibbutz. 
Introduction 
The economic crisis that overtook Israel in the mid 1980s had a dramatic effect on 
the traditional structure of the Kibbutz. Many kibbutzim
1 went through a severe fi-
nancial crisis and were unable to repay their immense debts to the banking system. 
They had to commit themselves to long term debt settlements with the banks, and 
became increasingly dependent on their creditors. 
The crisis weakened both the authority and status of the Kibbutz Movement, and 
caused a significant deterioration in its demographic and social structure, since much 
of the young generation had left the kibbutz, while new members were reluctant to 
join. Furthermore, kibbutzim that went bankrupt were no longer able to supply the 
basic needs of their members, especially of the older generation whose economic 
welfare has become insecure.  
Many kibbutzim felt, therefore, that fundamental changes had to be made and, in 
effect, various changes in all aspects of life have been gradually implemented in the 
majority of kibbutzim. For an overview of sociological aspects of the kibbutz crisis 
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and changes that appeared on this Journal, see Helman (1994); Ravid (1994); Rosner 
and Getz (1994); Rosolio (1994); Getz (1994); Palgi (1994); Don (1998); Rosner 
(1998); Shapira (1999) and Achouch (2000). 
The first change refers to economic management. In the traditional model, the 
economy of the kibbutz comprised various spheres of activity. Each branch was 
managed by its own specific manager, and the ensemble of activities was directed by 
the general economic manager of the kibbutz. Work, as well as management, were 
shared equally by kibbutz members, and no separation existed between the commu-
nity and economic activity (Rosner and Getz, 1996). 
In the new model, especially in the industrial sector, economic activity is separated 
from the community, separate corporations are established, and each branch is a separate 
profit center. Economic activity is managed by professional managers, who answer to a 
board of directors, as in a private company. The work is no longer done by kibbutz mem-
bers only, and outside employees are hired in accordance with purely economic criteria. 
Morever, a profound change occurred where the principle of collective responsi-
bility was concerned. The individual and family are now granted more independence 
and responsibility, in a manner that narrows down the degree of cooperation and 
equality in kibbutz life. Every kibbutz member is now responsible for his own liveli-
hood, and is entitled to a differential salary, reflecting his personal contribution to the 
community. The relationship between the individual and the collective has been rede-
fined in a way so as to increase the autonomy of the individual and the family, and 
decrease the responsibility of the collective. 
Another significant change in kibbutz lifestyle and in its principles relates to the 
possession of private property. According to the basic principle of the kibbutz, mem-
bers are not permitted to possess private property. Over the years, kibbutzim have 
accepted the idea that members may possess private property deriving from external 
sources. Furthermore, many kibbutz members, especially founding members, were 
troubled by the idea that they would not be able to bequeath their homes to their de-
scendants, and initiated legal action to allow the allocation of property (making 
kibbutz property the private property of kibbutz members). This initiative led the 
Israel Lands Administration ( legal owner of most of the land in Israel) to pass reso-
lutions permitting the allocation of apartments in the kibbutz and in the collective 
moshav, to their individual members.
2 Many kibbutzim have decided to approve this 
resolution, and have initiated the allocation of apartments to their members. 
The Kibbutz has also changed its relationship with the outside world. In the past, 
the kibbutzim were isolated and separate, maintaining their own form of economy, 
culture and education. Since the 1980s, a gradual tendency to intregrate with their 
surroundings has emerged. Kibbutz members work and study outside the kibbutz and 
vice versa. This integration increased even further when many kibbutzim decided to 
establish a neighborhood community, to reinforce and enlarge their population by 
building a nearby neighborhood for non-kibbutz members. 
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Economic and demographic facts 
The actual hard facts of the Kibbutz Movement are rather gloomy. Most of the kib-
butzim are in a difficult economic situation. Around 60 percent are insolvent and 
their members maintain a standard of living that is higher than they can afford. 
Around 79 percent cannot repay their debts to the banking system, and despite the 
generous remission of debts reflected in the kibbutzim debt settlement signed in the 
late 1980s, each kibbutz still owes an average debt balance of US$ 9,000,000. In 
addition to their debt to the banks, the kibbutzim carry a heavy burden of actuary 
debt for pension payments. 
The picture is not much brighter in the demographic field; the average age rises 
every year, and has now reached the age of 53. The population is aging steadily 
while most of the young generation are leaving the kibbutz. Today’s kibbutz popula-
tion constitutes less than 2 percent of the total population of Israel, as compared to 3 
percent in the past. This is demonstrated as follows:
3 
 
Table 1: Changes in kibbutz population 
 
Year Population 






Source:  The Public Committee on the Kibbutzim Issue (2003). 
 
Along with the rest of society, many kibbutzim have adopted a number of changes in 
their lifestyle, varying from the minor to the dramatic. 
These changes, can be divided into 3 main categories: 
1) Kibbutzim that have retained the traditional lifestyle, with minor changes 
Here the traditional kibbutz values are preserved, especially in the domains of educa-
tion, social life, community services, cooperative principles, kibbutz ownership of 
property, etc.  
The changes focus on making the kibbutz economically more productive and effi-
cient,  inter alia by privatizing certain services, employing outside workers and 
minimizing expenses, and by integrating the different productive sectors to minimize 
kibbutz exposure to economic risks. 
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2)  Kibbutzim that have implemented differential salaries and decided to allocate 
assets 
Kibbutzim that were in financial difficulties came under pressure to take more sig-
nificant steps in order to heighten efficiency and increase the individual economic 
security of their members. 
These kibbutzim, in addition to privatizing most of their community services and 
separating between the community and productive activity, have implemented differ-
ential salaries, namely – members receive different salaries according to their 
contribution to the community, and pay progressive taxes. To help the weaker sectors 
of the community, a security net was established to assist them in maintaining a 
minimum standard of living. 
When these kibbutzim have incurred heavy debts, and their assets are mortgaged 
to secure these debts, greater incentives exist to separate housing from other assets 
and to embark on measures to allocate apartments to kibbutz members. Some kibbut-
zim have also decided to establish a neighborhood community in order to expand, 
thicken and strengthen the social structure by means of new young families desiring 
to purchase a home in rural surroundings without having to adopt a kibbutz lifestyle 
and principles or become members. 
3) Kibbutzim that have implemented the allocation of productive assets 
This model reflects the most radical changes adopted by certain kibbutzim in order to 
cope with the economic and demographic deterioration.  
In this model, the kibbutz also allocates productive assets to its members, in addi-
tion to the allocation of apartments and privatization of community services. 
These changes include, inter alia, the incorporation of the productive branches 
under a holding company. The shares are allocated to the kibbutz and its members, 
and each member is entitled to own a certain percentage of shares, according to sen-
iority, up to a maximum percentage. The shares can be inherited and can be sold 
under certain conditions; they therefore possess a real economic worth. 
A new applicant for membership must buy his share according to economic 
valuation, and each member is entitled to compel the kibbutz to buy him out. In some 
cases, members are also entitled to annual dividends, depending on economic per-
formances. 
It should be clear, however, that variations may occur within the patterns, modi-
fied to fit the needs of each kibbutz.   The “Renewed” Kibbutz  41 
 
The need for redefinition 
As we can see, unlike in the past, when only one unified kibbutz model existed, kib-
butzim nowadays have developed in different directions, and various models have 
emerged. 
Some 25 percent of the kibbutzim maintain the traditional way of life and pre-
serve the basic values of mutual partnership, strict equality, and democratic 
management of their economic activity.
4  
The rest have adopted changes in the classical kibbutz structure, by encouraging 
members to be more autonomous and economically independent. They have also 
embraced capitalistic modes of conducting productive activity, while preserving the 
basic cooperative principle of community ownership of their production means. 
Nonetheless, a broad social solidarity remains, reflected in the principle of mutual 
guarantee and in maintaining the economic social security net. 
A few kibbutzim went even further, abandoning most of the basic traditional 
principles, and now allocate production means to their members. This step gave rise 
to the question of the conditions under which a kibbutz may still be perceived as a 
kibbutz, which led to a re-examination of the correct legal determination. 
The Beit Oren case 
In 1999, 8 members of Kibbutz Beit Oren applied to the High Court of Justice to 
instruct the Registrar of Cooperative Societies to abolish the classification of Beit 
Oren as a kibbutz and classify it as a different kind of cooperative society.
5 
The petitioners argued that the kibbutz had dramatically changed its lifestyle, in-
ter alia by implementing differential salaries, shutting down the communal dining 
room, and privatizing the educational system and other services. These changes 
failed to fit the legal definition of a kibbutz – particularly where the principle of 
equal consumption is concerned. Consequently, the Registrar of Cooperative Socie-
ties, authorized to register and classify cooperative societies, was requested to change 
the classification of Kibbutz Beit Oren, or initiate winding up proceedings. 
The kibbutz replied that it still maintained the basic principles of a kibbutz, and 
that the changes made were essential to prevent a financial collapse and to improve 
the economic situation.  
All the parties involved realized that this case was bound to reach beyond this le-
gal territory and would have wide implications on the issue of the kibbutzim as a 
whole.  
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The Public Committee  
The Beit Oren case brought home the need to tackle the problem. It was obvious that 
this was a very important social and public issue that would have great impact on 
Israeli society and should, therefore, be examined by a public committee. The State 
of Israel accordingly proposed this to the Supreme Court of Justice and following a 
government decision of February 2002, a committee was set up, comprising experts 
and delegates from relevant government ministries and the rural sector. 
The committee’s task was to recommend a new legal definition befitting the new 
development of the kibbutz. The committee was also asked to submit its opinion on 
the issue of allocating apartments to kibbutz members. 
After 12 months of work, the committee submitted a detailed report on the issues 
(hereinafter: The Report)
6. 
The legal redefinition 
The traditional legal definition of the Kibbutz in Israeli law, is as follows
7: A coop-
erative society that is a separate settlement, organized on the basis of collective 
ownership of assets, self employment, equality and cooperation in production, con-
sumption and education. 
It is clear that the changes made in the kibbutzim in the last decade, such as differen-
tial wages, privatization of services and allocation of apartments, cannot coexist with 
the traditional legal definition.  
Two different concepts exist in the Kibbutz Movement, reflecting different phi-
losophies on this issue. A minority of kibbutzim are of the opinion that this can only 
be a society that maintains the traditional principles and way of life, whereas the 
majority believe that the changes are part of the dynamic development of the kibbutz, 
and should be incorporated in the legal definition thereof. The Committee agreed 
unanimously that the kibbutzim should be able to determine their own way of life, 
and that there was no way to prevent the implementation of changes in kibbutzim 
desiring change. 
The Committee decided to create two new legal classifications for settlements 
presently known as kibbutzim. The first classification would be the term Communal 
Kibbutz, essentially identical to the traditional kibbutz definition. The second classi-
fication was to be the Renewed Kibbutz, which would include developments and 
changes in lifestyle, provided the basic principles of mutual guarantee and equality 
are preserved. 
In light of the above, the Committee recommended that two classifications would 
be created instead of the current legal definition of the kibbutz, namely: 
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a) The  “Communal  Kibbutz”: A cooperative society that is a separate settle-
ment, organized on the basis of collective ownership of assets, self employment, and 
equality and cooperation in production, consumption and education; 
b)  The “Renewed Kibbutz”: A cooperative society that is a separate settlement, 
organized on the basis of collective partnership in assets, self employment, equality 
and cooperation in production, consumption and education, that maintains mutual 
guarantee among its members, and whose articles of association include some or all 
of the following: 
(1)  Relative wages according to individual contribution or seniority;  
(2) Allocation  of  apartments; 
(3)  Allocation of production means to its members, excluding land, water and 
production quotas, provided that the cooperative society maintains control 
over the means of production and that its articles of association restrict the 
negotiability of allocated production means. 
Allocation of apartments 
The Public Committee also addressed the issue of apartment allocations. This issue 
involves many legal and social difficulties, some on the practical level and some on 
the theoretical level. Although the resolutions of the Israel Lands Administration 
establish an allocation procedure, they do not refer to potential problems within the 
kibbutz community. Once the apartments are the private property of members, the 
kibbutz risks losing control over its population, since foreigners can enter and the 
kibbutz is liable to lose its identity. Restrictions on negotiability need to be imposed 
in order to prevent such undesirable results; but how strict should they be?  
Moreover, what would be the criteria for allocation in terms of the determining 
day for entitlement? What apartment quotas should be available? What measures 
should be taken to set aside reserves for future expansion, etc.? 
In light of the above, the Committee recommended the following: 
1)  The allocation process may apply only to the Renewed Kibbutz, which per-
mits the possession of private property; 
2)  In order to preserve the unique character of the community within the kib-
butz, negotiability should be limited, to enable the kibbutz to maintain 
control over the identity of its residents and the right of first refusal to re-
purchase apartments;  
3)  The Kibbutz can choose two main ways to restrict negotiability – the first 
would be to restrict the sale of apartments to people who are accepted as 
members, and the second – to oblige new purchasers to become members of 
the new cooperative community society; 
4)   The Kibbutz must ensure at any given time that the majority of its residents are 
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5)  In any event of rights transfers (including inheritance), the Kibbutz would 
have the right of first refusal to purchase back the apartment at market value; 
6)  The allocation process would offset the payment the Kibbutz owes to mem-
bers who leave;
8 
7)  Kibbutz members would be entitled to compel the kibbutz to purchase their 
apartments instead of making the leaving payment noted above, provided 
that they cease to be members. 
With regard to the two patterns of restrictions on negotiability, the Committee‘s 
report recommends that principles be outlined in greater detail. All these principles 
would have to form part of the Articles of Association and of the contracts signed 
between the kibbutz and each member. 
The Committee also stated its opinion on the issue of the determining date, 
namely, the decision that only people who were members on the determining day and 
onwards (or their heirs) would be entitled to an apartment. 
In this connection, note must be made of a recent district court decision in the 
case of Kibbutz Glil Yam near Herzliyah city
9. In this case, the court decided that 
only people who were kibbutz members at the time the kibbutz decided to adopt ba-
sic changes in its lifestyle, and amend its articles of association so as to permit, at 
some point, property allocation and privatization, would be entitled to share in the 
kibbutz assets. All members who left the kibbutz, or passed away, prior to that day 
would not have any rights of ownership. 
An appeal was recently submitted in a further case, requesting the Supreme Court 
of Justice to declare that all kibbutz members, past or present, are entitled to a share 
in the kibbutz assets or, alternatively, that the determining day must correspond to 
the date on which the Israel Lands Administration decided to allow the allocation of 
apartments (2/96).
10 
The Committee is of the opinion that, in principle, only people who were kibbutz 
members when the decision to allocate apartments was approved by the general as-
sembly, would be entitled to receive an apartment.  
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Mutual guarantee and equality 
Two of the most basic principles of the traditional Kibbutz way of life, are mutual 
guarantee and equality. These principles are at risk, following the dramatic changes 
in the traditional way of life. Differential salaries necessarily mean that kibbutz 
members are no longer equal in their income and financial capacities. The privatiza-
tion of community services, such as health, welfare and education, was a blow to the 
weaker population of the kibbutz – the handicapped and the elderly. These members 
are extremely concerned by the privatization process, since they constitute the most 
vulnerable part of the community. In some cases, for example, elderly members 
spend most of their monthly allowance on the purchase of medicines, with little left 
to conduct a decent life and for their basic needs.  
For this reason, emphasis must be placed on the need to maintain the basic prin-
ciples in the Renewed Kibbutz. Some scholars even believe
11 that a minimum social 
security net should be determined by proper legislation, so that the decision is not left 
to the discretion of the kibbutz management and in order to create equal standards. In 
light of the above, the Public Committee recommended the following guidelines: 
1)  Mutual guarantee must be a pre-condition to the existence of the Renewed 
Kibbutz and should be maintained in order to secure basic rights for its 
members; 
2)  The Renewed Kibbutz must safeguard basic equality among members, by 
maintaining a security net and mutual aid funds for health, welfare and edu-
cation, and by providing aid to groups with special needs; 
3)  Members are entitled to certain minimum rights – minimum wage for mem-
bers of working age, minimum pension for elders, social security and the 
right to accommodation; 
4)  The Kibbutz Movement would prepare proposals for the minimum platform 
of rights as noted above, and the Registrar of Cooperative Societies would 
ensure that the minimum needs of members are protected, especially those of 
groups with special needs.  
The required majority 
The question of what majority is required to pass a decision to adopt essential 
changes in the kibbutz way of life, resulting in the redefinition of the traditional Kib-
butz to a Renewed Kibbutz, is controversial. 
Some argue that since these changes are so significant, they contradict the most 
basic principles and ideology that form the basis of consent of the founding mem-
bers, and therefore cannot be altered by a majority of votes in the kibbutz general 
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assembly, and that an agreement of 100 percent of members is needed (rendering this 
practically impossible). 
This argument relies also on a Supreme Court precedent in the Pri-Haemek 
case
12, which abolished a regulation purporting to charge members of a cooperative 
society with debts of the cooperative without their prior consent. The Supreme Court 
ruled that such a significant impact on members’ right of ownership needed the con-
sent of each member. Furthermore, these changes undermine the legitimate 
expectations of the senior and weaker members of the kibbutz, who contributed the 
best years of their lives to the kibbutz, expecting to receive the full support of the 
collective in the future, when they would be old and retired. 
Indeed, from a purely legal point of view, these changes constitute a change of 
the basis of consent and, according to the standard kibbutz articles of association, this 
issue cannot be amended by a decision of the general assembly. These changes are 
especially dramatic for the older generation of kibbutz founders, who surrendered the 
ownership of private property in favor of the kibbutz collective ideals. Naturally, 
these members still maintain and wish to preserve the traditional way of life. 
From a practical point of view, however, we cannot ignore the ongoing process of 
change that most of the kibbutzim are going through, some of them because it is the 
only way to survive as a kibbutz. Furthermore, in most cases the process has proved 
successful, and the kibbutz economic and social situation has improved dramatically, 
and it would be unwise to disrupt it by posing an impossible demand for absolute 
majority. 
Instead of according priority to the will of a small minority in the kibbutzim, we 
should tackle the problematic aspects of the process that cause concern to the older 
generation and to the handicapped members, and establish suitable arrangements to 
ensure that the weaker members will maintain a reasonable existence. Protective ar-
rangements of this nature should not be liable to changes in the future, to ensure that 
the rights of the weaker members are preserved. If such arrangements are accepted, 
most members who have objected so far would be satisfied.  
According to Professor Smadar Ottolenghi, the legal difficulty of altering the ba-
sis of consent can be solved by having the Registrar of Cooperative Societies 
redefine the Kibbutz as a Renewed Kibbutz provided that 75 percent of members 
vote for this move. Once the Kibbutz is re-defined as a Renewed Kibbutz, the old 
principles that formed the basis of consent in the articles of association would no 
longer be valid, since these articles would be subject to the Cooperative Societies 
Regulations. In that case, the kibbutz needs to adopt new articles, adjusted to Re-
newed Kibbutz principles and including a proper mechanism to protect the needs of 
the weaker population. According to the regulations, every change in the articles is 
subject to the approval of the Registrar. In practice, the Registrar will be the author-
ity who ensures that the new articles include sufficient protection of the minorities’ 
rights and provide an adequate social security net. 
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We would also mention that, according to the regulations, any amendment of the 
articles of association requires a special 75 percent majority of votes of the members 
participating in the assembly, and a quorum of at least 66 percent of the total mem-
bership of the cooperative society needs to be present at the assembly. Thus a strict 
requirement exists for a special majority, to ensure that decisions of this nature are 
taken seriously. 
The Committee is of the opinion that the process of kibbutz redefinition can be 
carried out with the broad consent of its members, and the required majority is the 
same as the majority needed to pass a decision to amend the kibbutz articles of asso-
ciation, namely 75 percent. The Committee points out that more extreme decisions, 
such as winding up the cooperative or transforming it into a company, require a spe-
cial 75 percent majority of votes, and that there is no demand for an absolute 
majority. No reason exists, therefore, to demand an absolute majority in the redefini-
tion process. 
The Committee also takes into consideration the fact that many kibbutzim are in-
terested in the redefinition process, and that this should not be prevented by 
demanding an absolute majority. However, the decision must obtain a broad consent. 
Since this is a problematic issue, the Committee recommended that the procedure 
of redefining the Renewed Kibbutz be handled by proper legislation. 
Neighborhood communities 
A further central issue within the kibbutzim relates to the process that began in the 
early 1990s: establishing neighborhood communities on kibbutz land, near a residential 
area. The process is based on resolutions of the Israel Lands Administration, awarding 
substantial financial benefits to the rural sector
13. Notwithstanding the fact that these 
resolutions were declared void and were abolished by the Supreme Court of Justice
14, 
and while the new resolutions pertaining to the process provide no economic incentive 
to establish a neighborhood community, many kibbutzim have chosen to do so, in order 
to thicken their dwindling population with fresh and young residents. 
The two communities live side by side, on the same kibbutz. They share the same 
public facilities, such as kindergartens, schools, sport clubs, libraries, social clubs, 
etc. They are also provided with the same municipal services, sharing the mainte-
nance of municipal services, security guards, education and cultural life. 
The residents of the neighborhood community are not kibbutz members, they own 
their homes, and the neighborhood is located outside the kibbutz land. The kibbutz 
continues to be administrated by its traditional organs, the general assembly, and the 
management committee that directs productive activity and takes care of the needs of 
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kibbutz members. 
There is no doubt that neighborhood communities have enhanced the economic 
and demographic situation of the kibbutzim. However, the different status of two 
communities in the same kibbutz also creates problems in the municipal area, where 
the residents of the new community cannot elect their own municipal committee as 
do kibbutz members. As for the social sphere, inequality prevails in the economic 
welfare of the two communities: one with old houses and poor members, and the 
other with new, luxurious houses and upper middle-class residents. 
Recent research findings submitted to the Public Committee
15, dealing with the 
social implications of the neighborhood communities on kibbutzim, concluded that 
whenever the two communities are not separated, they tend to mix and share the 
same social fabric of the kibbutz. 
The Committee is concerned that these kibbutzim could lose their independent 
character. It therefore believes that the preferable way to increase the kibbutz popula-
tion is by admitting new members. However, as neighborhood communities are an 
important tool in increasing the population in certain kibbutzim, this could be done 
when necessary, albeit the kibbutz should preserve its uniqueness and its values. 
What does the future hold? 
Unlike in the past, the kibbutz today has many and varied faces and patterns that 
differ from the familiar, traditional model. This new reality led to the establishment 
of the Public Committee, aimed at creating a new classification that would coexist 
with the current situation. But the main question remains: what is the core essence in 
the definition of a kibbutz? This question applies particularly to the majority of kib-
butzim that fit the Renewed kibbutz definition. 
According to the Committee’s opinion, the traditional definition, as does the new 
one, represents a unique form of collective, which upholds the values of mutual 
guarantee, equality and care for the weak members. In our opinion, most kibbutzim 
fail to meet even the new definition of Renewed Kibbutz, because there is no equal-
ity among members – not in their revenues, not in their consumption, nor in their 
production. Kibbutzim pay differential wages, and in their search for cheap labor 
they prefer to employ outsiders and not kibbutz members, meaning that even the 
value of self-employment is disregarded. 
Furthermore, due to the drastic cutbacks in community services, not much re-
mains of the mutual guarantee principle, and members increasingly need to rely on 
themselves. 
According to the office of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, the majority of 
kibbutzim have decided to allocate apartments to their members. These facts, along 
                                                        
15  See in this regard the comments of M. Topel, to the Public Committee about the research by M. 
Glass (forthcoming).    The “Renewed” Kibbutz  49 
 
with the ongoing process of privatization and the adoption of capitalistic methods, 
are taking the kibbutz further away from the traditional model, bringing it closer to 
models of a Moshav or community settlement. For this reason, several kibbutzim 
have embarked on a new process of transformation to Moshavim
16 – a more suitable 
settlement model, with private property, a developed community life and cooperation 
in production.  
Out of more than 270 registered kibbutzim in Israel, only a small minority of ap-
proximately 20 kibbutzim
17 have decided to adopt a general allocation of the kibbutz 
assets, including production means. These kibbutzim have crossed a red line, also 
where the new, liberal definition of Renewed Kibbutz is concerned, and they cannot 
continue to be classified as kibbutzim. 
About 25 percent of the kibbutzim still preserve the traditional way of life, thus 
ensuring their future as a kibbutz. 
The future will show whether this is only a temporary step in the inevitable trans-
formation of the kibbutzim to community settlements, or whether the Renewed 
Kibbutz is a conversion of the kibbutz principle of continuation and adjustment to the 
changing times, thus enabling the kibbutz to remain a dominant factor in the forma-
tion of Israeli society.  
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